AFRO-NETS> Bad Blood (10) [additional remarks from the author]

[Rico Carisch <rico.carisch@worldnet.att.net>]

Bad Blood (10) [additional remarks from the author]
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As the principal researcher and one of the authors of the Stern story 
"Bad Blood" I would like to provide some additional remarks.

By laying out the facts in as much detail as possible, I hoped, read-
ers would judge for themselves who the culprits are, where the BTS 
need improvements and which organizations should take their duties 
more serious, interpret their role more proactive. 

Nobody takes away from Zimbabwe and Namibia, that these countries de-
spite much adverse factors, have probably created very good blood 
collection and distribution systems. The people I have met at ZimNBTS 
seem competent, certainly guided by the best intentions and, I m 
sure, to a large extent are very able to perform an important task 
for their society. Does that justify blanket approval regardless of 
new questions, regardless of disturbing investigations in Europe? The 
two prostitutes we reported and documented as having been donors to 
ZimBTS are merely symbols for the one fact of life nobody in his 
right mind can deny: there is no 100 percent safety. Constant vigi-
lance is required.

Now, judge for yourself:

The crucial point of my story is in Vienna. Containers full of 
plasma, that according to all available documents, according to all 
statements made by the suspects and according to the investigators 
have come from Zimbabwe and Namibia via South Africa. These contain-
ers have been confiscated, the plasma was tested and found to be 
tainted with HIV and Hepatitis. These facts are known since early 
1997. They were reported in newspaper articles all over the world, 
including South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia. Letters sent by the Aus-
trian Health authorities warned WHO and many countries. There was no 
reaction. Since that time, more information was made available at in-
ternational conferences. Health inspectors and operators of blood 
banks have been briefed. There was still no reaction. All the in-
volved countries seemed to pretend, that the Albovina case was proba-
bly just a crazed reaction by some Austrian government employees. One 
of the suspects claimed this to be "a career-enhancing opportunity 
for inept government regulators". Another suspect outright sued the 
Austrian representative who wrote a warning letter to WHO. 

For further clarification about the reaction of those who should be 
self-motivated to check into any negative allegations, look up the 
media reports , for example May 16/1998. The Saturday Star reported: 
An angry Dennis Connolly, general manager of the Zimbabwe Blood 
Transfusion Service, was also contacted by the Saturday Star. When 
asked whether his service had sent plasma disguised as originating 
from another country, Connolly said: "officially we haven't". He re-
fused to discuss the matter further and, before he slammed down the 
telephone, he said: "I don't enjoy this, and I don't intend talking 
about it."

Nobody contacted the Austrian or Swiss investigators to inquire about 
the state of the pending cases. Nobody attempted to learn how the 
suspects operated. And how possible gaps in the safety systems could 
be closed. Everybody just waited to be served the facts on silver 
platters. Instead of investigating the allegations, instead of re-
searching all available leads and cooperating and encouraging a com-
plete audit of the involved blood banks, the responsible im-
port/export authorities, WHO now quibbles about minor points of our 
story and thus attempts to devalue its findings. 

In internal discussions, we know, WHO has been worried about our sto-
ries for months. Outwardly, WHO took the stance, that a) what can be 
done, has been done, b) WHO has no possibility to go against crooks, 
c) don't criticize Zimbabwe. Internally, a bunch of long overdue de-
cisions were made to strengthen existing recommendations and proce-
dures in the field of blood safety. These proposals had been made by 
good and conscientious WHO personnel. Their superiors had shelved and 
disregarded these initiatives for years. In recent months, under the 
looming shadow of my impending story, these worthwhile ideas suddenly 
became part of the WHO blood safety agenda. Great, I m happy for that 
change.

But the national and international parties responsible for blood 
safety still are not making any attempt to get to the bottom of this 
mess. How did bad plasma get out from NBTS Zimbabwe and Namibia? Who 
is responsible for that? How can that safety gap be closed? And how 
can the head of NBTS Zimbabwe on October 9/1998 again cut a deal with 
the same plasma dealer allowing him to export huge quantities of 
plasma? And why did the National Health Laboratory Services in Preto-
ria issue to the same dealer another import permit for "normal human 
plasma in quantities as required"? 

PS: I met most of the responsible individuals and suspects. All of 
them are white.

--
Rico Carisch
mailto:rico.carisch@worldnet.att.net

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