AFRO-NETS> Barriers to African Regional Integration

[Claudio Schuftan <aviva@netnam.vn>]

Barriers to African Regional Integration
----------------------------------------
The International Aid System and Corporate Interests
 
From: <pambazuka-news@pambazuka.org>
by Alex De Waal*
 
Why is the entire African continental economy no larger than Spain's, 
at $580 billion? Why is the combined GDP of the 40-plus countries 
that lie between South Africa and Egypt scarcely bigger than the an-
nual turnover of ExxonMobil? There's a weary consensus that blames 
low prices for Africa's agricultural exports, corruption, cash-
starved infrastructure and, increasingly, the devastating economic 
impact of AIDS. But less explored is the perverse logic of dividing 
Africa's small economic space into fifty sovereign entities. Regional 
economic integration is an absolute prerequisite for poverty reduc-
tion: expanding markets, attracting investment, and increasing sav-
ings. Unfortunately, there are powerful interests that stand in its 
way - mainly the politicians and bureaucrats who extract rent from 
their possession of sovereign privileges to tax and regulate.
 
Take Djibouti in northeast Africa. It has about half a million people 
and virtually no domestic economy. It depends wholly on three things: 
a port and railway link that serve the much larger economy of land-
locked Ethiopia, a French military base (recently augmented by a U.S. 
command centre, used for keeping watch on Yemen and monitoring al 
Qa'ida's attempts to infiltrate the Horn of Africa), and lastly the 
fact that tiny Djibouti, by virtue of its sovereign independence, has 
a seat at the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League, 
and therefore also has representation at the World Bank, United Na-
tions specialised agencies and bilateral donors. A simple survey will 
show that across Africa, the smaller the country, the more aid it re-
ceives per capita. Partly this is simply because most nations have a 
desk officer in every large aid bureaucracy and thus a champion in 
the system. And partly it is because every now and then, the vote of 
that country may become important in some critical international fo-
rum. (The U.S. suddenly became much more conciliatory towards Angola 
last summer, coinciding with Angola taking one of Africa's seats on 
the U.N. Security Council.) Small countries are also more attractive 
as sites for military bases: their domestic problems are more manage-
able and their loyalty is more easily obtained than larger ones.
 
Five years ago, there was some discussion that Djibouti might merge 
with its neighbour Ethiopia. The rents that Djibouti's rulers can ex-
tract from the international system have put paid to that. On the 
other side of the continent, tiny Gambia broke up its sensible con-
federation with its sole and much larger neighbour, Senegal, because 
its leading officials were profiting too little from the arrangement. 
 
The executives of international oil corporations, avowed globalisers 
in theory, are in practice the friends of regressive political econo-
mies. Oil companies prefer to negotiate deals with small countries 
rather than large ones: in a country with a million people, political 
stability can simply be bought, whereas there is a sad history of oil 
fuelling conflict in larger countries like Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. 
Oil wealth is a top-down resource: it's easy to distribute as lar-
gesse, and the smaller the constituency, the more effective it can 
be. 
 
NGOs certainly have no intention to impede the continent's growth, 
but their operations may, at times, do exactly that. Aid agencies 
control substantial parts of the transport sector in Mozambique, but 
their contracts are not awarded through competitive bidding, but in-
stead on opaque criteria developed by bureaucrats behind closed doors 
in Washington or Brussels. The domestic entrepreneurial class cannot 
compete.
 
Forty years ago, Africa's independence leaders came together to form 
the Organisation of African Unity - a minimum framework for organis-
ing the continent during the turmoils of the Cold War. Ordinary Afri-
cans longed for something more: true political unity. Last year in 
Durban, Africa's heads of state finally agreed to establish an Afri-
can Union, a big step along this road. The new institution promises 
to build an ambitious array of institutions including a Pan African 
Parliament, but it is likely to be hampered by financial weakness and 
the vested interests of governing elites. Regional economic integra-
tion has historically been driven by a powerful manufacturing sector 
seeking to expand its markets. This is the case for Europe, the Far 
East and North America, and is manifestly the case for economic glob-
alisation. By contrast, regional integration among non-industrialised 
countries has had more modest achievements - from the Mercusur eco-
nomic cooperation pact in Latin America to the historic alliance of 
independent frontline African states against Apartheid South Africa. 
 
As the least developed continent, Africa faces the greatest chal-
lenges to integration. With the exception of South Africa, it is 
largely dependent on agrarian produce, minerals and aid. The African 
Union's member states have long been used to seeing their continental 
organisation as a forum to defend their sovereign interests, and a 
bureaucracy in which to place 'their men'. The current and incoming 
chairs - South Africa and Mozambique -are both democracies, but there 
are fears as to the standing of the Union if a less respected country 
were to become its head.
 
However, there have been encouraging steps. In its last years the Or-
ganisation for African Unity refused to recognise the putschists in 
Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, and insisting on only accepting rulers 
who come to power through constitutional means. But only when a Pan-
African parliament is established that can set continental standards 
for democracy, mineral companies forced to become more transparent 
about payments to countries, and aid distributed in ways that promote 
economic integration, will Africa begin to escape its structural pa-
ralysis. That will require African leaders to sacrifice the spoils of 
sovereignty for the long-term promise of continental development.
 
* Alex de Waal is Programme Director for the Commission for HIV/AIDS 
and Governance in Africa, and a director of Justice Africa. This edi-
torial is a shortened version of an essay from the book 'Unbinding 
Africa: Making globalisation work for good governance', edited by 
Phoebe Griffith. More information: 
http://www.pambazuka.org/newsletter.php?
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